



A Conceptual Framework for Self-Organising MAS

Andrea Omicini, Alessandro Ricci, Mirko Viroli

DEIS, Sede di Cesena – Alma Mater Studiorum, Università di Bologna

Cristiano Castelfranchi, Luca Tummolini

ISTC-CNR - Roma, Italy

Outline

- “Cognitive” self-organisation
 - SOS why, where, and how
 - stigmergy, environment & intelligent agents
- BIC & beyond
 - behavioural implicit communication (BIC)
 - generalisation of BIC
- Shared Environment (s-env)
 - observability in s-env & epistemic actions
 - formalisation
- Conclusion

SOS why?

- SOS (Self-Organising Systems) typically exhibit desirable properties like
 - robustness
 - fault-tolerance
 - adaptation to change
- Computational SOS are meant to subsume the same nice features
 - self-healing, self-repairing
 - self-configuring, self-adapting

SOS where?

- Physical systems
 - magnetic materials
- Biological systems
 - cytoskeletal filaments in cytoplasm of eukariotic cells
- Social systems
 - ant nests, swarms
 - human systems
 - “sponteous parking patterns” (Castelfranchi)
- Computational systems
 - peer-to-peer systems

SOS what?

- SOSs are systems that
 - exhibit some forms of *global* order / direction
 - organisation, structure, architecture
 - which emerges from non-ordered, non-directed *local* behaviours / interactions
- As a result, definitory features of SOSs are
 - lack of centralised control
 - locality of interaction between components

Computational SOS bias

- “Intelligent” global behaviour
 - in a very broad sense
- vs. “non-intelligent” individual components
 - where intelligence is not a fundamental feature for individuals
 - e.g.: the behaviour of an ant nest is far more “intelligent” when compared to the single ant’s one
- Seeley 2002
 - “a fundamental flaw in many studies of self-organisation: the assumption that the subunits of a self-organised system are dumb”
- Computational SOS seem biased along this line

The MAS shift

- Local interaction based on agent communication
 - direct interaction
 - non-mediated interaction
- MAS self-organisation based on social interaction
 - communication, negotiation, coordination
- Example: AMAS theory
 - there, self-organisation depends on the ability of the agents to be *locally* “cooperative”
 - based on their ability to subjectively interpret interactions with other agents and the environment
 - cognitive abilities at play
- *However!*
 - it is always EITHER mediated interaction & dumb agents OR direct interaction & cognitive agents

Some points of ours here

- Agents are not ants
 - environment-based coordination and mediated interaction not only for reactive agents, but also for cognitive/intelligent agents
- Generalise stigmergy for MAS
 - mediated interaction
 - like pheromon-based stigmergy
 - with cognitive agents
 - unlike pheromon-based stigmergy
- Understand the role of the (MAS) environment
 - shaping the environment to enable / promote cognitive self-organisation
- Understand the role of the (MAS) infrastructure
 - to shape the environment
 - through suitably expressive abstractions

Interaction *is* mediated

- Social activity is mediated
 - Social-psychological theories
 - Activity Theory, Distributed Cognition
 - AT
 - agent activity in societies / organisations is always mediated by artifacts
 - physical, cognitive, ...
- Direct interaction results from an abstraction process
 - abstracting away from the interaction medium
 - sometimes applicable, sometimes not
 - which generates the distinction between direct vs. indirect interaction
- Interaction is always mediated
 - we have just to understand the nature & the role of the medium

What is communication?

- Communication is interaction plus intentionality?
 - Palo Alto: “Any behaviour is communication”
 - An agent selects a behaviour aim at informing another agent
 - typically, a *codified* behaviour
 - *But!*
- Explicit communication is only a part of the story in complex societies
 - Humans and animals usually communicate with no need of codified [= rigid] patterns of action
 - for instance, teaching by example
- Requirements
 - *Observation / observability of actions*
 - *Awareness of observation*

Coordination without communication

- More generally, many patterns of interaction / coordination
 - do not require explicit communication
 - do not even require *any* kind of communication
 - e.g., the prey / predator pattern
 - e.g. tracking pattern might be either of the two
 - depending on the intentions of the tracked
- In general
 - observation of actions
 - awareness
 - possibly mutual
 - play a central role in a number of fundamental patterns of coordination within social systems
- Also, they are at the core of several interesting SOS phenomena in social systems

Behavioural Implicit Communication

- The agent (*source*) performs a usual *practical action* (like eating, walking, sitting, cleaning etc.)
- The agent also *knows* (*awareness*) and lets (or makes) the other agent (*addressee*) *observe* and *understand* such a behavior
 - i.e. capture some meaning from that “message”
- because this is part of the agent (motivating or non-motivating) goals in performing that action
- Note
 - stigmergy is a special form of BIC which deals with post-hoc traces of actions
 - no observation of the action in stigmergic coordination


BIC examples

- Starting to cross the road is a tacit message for the car driver to stop
 - then, the car driver might as well ignore your message...
- While moving a table together, the feeling of the other person's movements holding the table enables coordination
 - often, communication here mixes codified & non codified messages
- The broom hampering the entrance in the toilet is an easily removable obstacle that is used mainly as a message "do not enter, it is wet"
 - this is a form of stigmergy
- The safe footprints of a scout in a mined field are messages "put your foot here"
 - another form stigmergy

Requirements for BIC

- Enabling conditions for BIC
 - observability of practical actions *and* of their traces
 - the environment might either enable observability or prevent it
 - ability to understand and interpret actions
 - ability to understand the other's perception / understanding of actions
 - the environment might allow an agent to know who is observing, and how it is reacting
- And, of course, in the MAS case
 - an infrastructure might well account for a suitably-shaped environment

Forms of Observation-based Coordination (I)



Forms of Observation-based Coordination (II)

$$Uni(x, y, \alpha, S) \triangleq$$

$$Obs(x, y, \alpha) \in S \wedge I_x coord(x, y, \alpha)$$

$$UniAW(x, y, \alpha, S) \triangleq$$

$$Uni(x, y, \alpha, S) \wedge B_y obs(x, y, \alpha) \in S$$

$$Bi(x, y, \alpha, S) \triangleq Uni(x, y, \alpha, S) \wedge Uni(y, x, \alpha, S)$$

$$Rec(x, y, \alpha, S) \triangleq$$

$$UniAW(x, y, \alpha, S) \wedge UniAW(y, x, \alpha, S)$$

$$Mut(x, y, \alpha, S) \triangleq Rec(x, y, \alpha, S)$$

$$\wedge B_x I_y coord(y, x, \alpha) \wedge B_y I_x coord(x, y, \alpha)$$

The role of BIC in dynamic social order

- Global social order cannot be mainly created and maintained by explicit and formal norms, supported only by a centralised control, formal monitoring, reporting and surveillance protocols
- *Social order* needs to be *self-organising*, spontaneous and informal, with spontaneous and decentralised forms of control and of sanction
- Examples
 - imitation for rule propagation
 - fulfilment of social commitments
 - local reissuing of norms

Shaping the environment

- Advanced forms of *cognitive self-organisation* require a suitably shaped environment
 - what does “suitably shaped” means?
- Common environment (c-env)
 - allowing agents to to keep track of its state and evolution, and possibly affect it
- Shared environment (s-env)
 - a c-env, that also enables
 - different forms of observability of other agents’ actions
 - awareness of such observability
 - that is, an agent is allowed to know is someone is observing its actions
- Note
 - a s-env inherently supports unilateral, bilateral, reciprocal and mutual coordination

Defining s-envs

- The level of observability of a s-env defines the s-env itself
- Observability is expressed in terms of
 - $Pow(x, y, \alpha)$
 - the power of agent x to observe action α executed by agent y
 - Power relation
 - describes the set of opportunities and constraints for agent observation in a s-env
 - $Obs(x, y, \alpha)$
 - the fact that the environment is making x observe actions α executed by agent y
 - Observability relation
 - describes the state of observation in a s-env
 - Pow vs. $Obs.$ is potential vs. actual
- To be fully understood, Pow and Obs requires the agent viewpoint over observation to be accounted for

Epistemic State

- Epistemic State (ES)
 - the beliefs the agent has due to its observation role
- The ES of an agent includes its *environmental knowledge*
 - knowledge about the agents it is observing
 - knowledge about the agents that are observing it
 - knowledge about the action execution it is observing
- modelled as agent beliefs
 - e.g. $Bz \text{ obs}(x, y, \alpha)$
- ES evolves through Epistemic Actions
 - actions aimed at acquiring knowledge

Motivational State

- Motivational State (MS)
 - includes all intentions of an agent at a given time
- MS and Epistemic Actions
 - intentions to acquire knowledge
 - to observe another agent
 - to check whether the agent is observed
 - to stop observing another agent

MAS configuration & evolution

- A MAS configuration is a composition of both agent and environmental properties
 - environment configuration
 - a composition of *Pow* and *Obs* terms
 - agent configuration
 - a composition of mental properties
 - beliefs *B* and intentions *I*
- MAS evolution
 - the environment reacts to the MS updating the ES according to the rewrite rules specified in the operational semantics

Syntax of MAS configurations

S	$::=$	$0 \mid A \mid E \mid S \parallel S$	MAS configuration
E	$::=$	0 $\mid Pow(x, y, \alpha)$ $\mid Obs(x, y, \alpha)$ $\mid E \parallel E$	environment configuration x has the power to observe y 's α x is observing y 's α composition
A	$::=$	0 $\mid B_x \phi$ $\mid I_x \phi$ $\mid A \parallel A$	agent configuration belief of x intention of x composition
ϕ	$::=$	$obs(x, y, \alpha)$ $\mid coord(x, y, \alpha)$ $\mid check(x, y, \alpha)$ $\mid drop(x, y, \alpha)$ $\mid done(x, \alpha)$ $\mid \neg \phi \mid I_x \phi \mid B_x \phi$	formulas x is observing y 's α x coordinates with y through α check whether x is observing y 's α prevent x from observing y 's α x executes actions α structured formulas

Operational semantics of agent configurations

$$\frac{Obs(x, y, \alpha) \in S}{I_z check(x, y, \alpha) \parallel S \rightarrow B_z obs(x, y, \alpha) \parallel S} \quad [\text{CHECK}]$$

$$\frac{Obs(x, y, \alpha) \notin S}{I_z check(x, y, \alpha) \parallel S \rightarrow B_z \neg obs(x, y, \alpha) \parallel S} \quad [\text{N-CHECK}]$$

$$\frac{-}{I_z drop(x, y, \alpha) \parallel B_z obs(x, y, \alpha) \parallel Obs(x, y, \alpha) \parallel S \rightarrow B_z \neg obs(x, y, \alpha) \parallel S} \quad [\text{DROP-Y}]$$

$$\frac{Obs(x, y, \alpha) \notin S}{I_z drop(x, y, \alpha) \parallel B_z obs(x, y, \alpha) \parallel S \rightarrow B_z \neg obs(x, y, \alpha) \parallel S} \quad [\text{DROP-N}]$$

$$\frac{-}{I_z obs(x, y, \alpha) \parallel Pow(x, y, \alpha) \parallel S \rightarrow B_z obs(x, y, \alpha) \parallel Pow(x, y, \alpha) \parallel Obs(x, y, \alpha) \parallel S} \quad [\text{ASK}]$$

$$\frac{I_x done(x, \alpha) \parallel S \rightarrow I_x done(x, \alpha) \parallel S'}{I_x done(x, \alpha) \parallel Obs(y, x, \alpha) \parallel S \rightarrow I_x done(x, \alpha) \parallel Obs(y, x, \alpha) \parallel B_y done(x, \alpha) \parallel S'} \quad [\text{OBS-R}]$$

$$\frac{Obs(y, x, \alpha) \notin S}{I_x done(x, \alpha) \parallel S \rightarrow B_x done(x, \alpha) \parallel S} \quad [\text{OBS-F}]$$

$$\frac{-}{A \parallel S \rightarrow A' \parallel S} \quad [\text{AGENT}]$$


Notes upon the formal model

- Why a formal model if (for now) it is not used to prove properties?
 - typical remark / criticism of awful reviewers...
- The formal system forced us to *obliterate ambiguities* obvious emerging from the cooperation between research groups with different experiences, competences and skills
- The formal system is simple enough to work as a element of *clarity* and understanding for the reader, rather than to introduce further complexity to the global picture
- The formal system works as a *specification* for our infrastructures and systems

S-env in TuCSoN

- The required features of the shared environment translate to the requirements for the MAS infrastructure
 - believe it or not, we are using TuCSoN :)
- Each agent is assigned its own ACC (agent coordination context) that records the allowed agent's actions
 - $Pow(x, y, \alpha)$
 - The ACC labels the actions that are observable
 - publish-subscribe like mechanism
 - $Obs(x, y, \alpha)$
 - The intention $Ix obs(x, y, \alpha)$ of agent x to observe agent y 's action makes the infrastructure enable the observation
 - The ACCs record any observation action of their agents
 - Awareness
 - ACCs provide agents with a service to detect if they are observed, by connecting epistemic knowledge from different agents / ACCs

A Possible Implementation in TuCSoN



Summing up

- MASs built on top of a BIC-oriented infrastructure exhibit the basic enabling principles which typically characterise self-organisation
 - local interaction
 - decentralised control
 - emergent patterns
- Besides, other interesting principles of SOS can be recasted in our framework
 - individual-based models
 - (thermodynamic) openness
 - non-linearity & (positive) feedback
 - dissipative structures
- Along this line, complex systems engineers might find a solution to the “global vs. local control” dichotomy



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